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Abstract: 
This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-
monetary incentive like status. We intend to summarize the different studies in a concise 
manner and comment on the divergent views on valuation for status, relation between 
monetary and status incentives, the technique of modeling status and on the cost of 
introducing status.  We also underline the some probable adverse consequences associated 
with the use of status incentive. In this paper it also highlights the problem associated with 
asymmetric information in the labour market, specifically, the (post contractual) moral 
hazard problem. 
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1. Introduction: 
The well-being of an economy is measured by the growth in production. Production 
means efficient transformation of input into outputs. The primary inputs used in production 
process are capital and labour. Though the productivity of the physical capital is generally 
comprehendible but labour’s effort put into the production process is often dependent on 
various behavioural issues other than the skill or aptitude of the labour. The human abilities 
are heterogeneous and hence it is difficult to judge the exact amount of output which one unit 
of labour can generate. At the same time human beings are opportunists 1 by nature 
(Williamson, 1973). Strategic disclosure of asymmetrically distributed information by 
individuals to their advantage breaks in the problem of opportunism. Thus, one of the major 
concerns in dealing with labour productivity is informational asymmetry. When information 
asymmetry is difficult to overcome with a small amount of cost then the problem aggravates 
further.  These behavioural issues affecting the labour productivity has been widely studied in 
social science, especially in economics. Examples of this problem of opportunism are adverse 
selection, moral hazard and information monopoly.  In this paper we mainly focus on moral 
hazard problem and how incentive works in mitigating this problem. Specifically, the aim of 
this study is to summarize the different views in existing literature on use of status as a non- 
monetary incentive in the eliciting desirable effort from the workers.  
Williamson (1973) in his pioneering work has explained how these set of human 
behavioural attributes together with the non-technological factors induce a shift of 
transactions from market to organization. In market transactions the relationship established 
between parties (i.e., the seller and buyer of labour/service) is short lived and hence the 
problem of opportunism is not grave. But this short run feature of market transactions induces 
high transaction cost. For clarity of notion, consider a director of an educational institute 
trying to run the institute with visiting faculty only. It is evident that it is a tasking job to find 
new faculty after a frequent interval from the market, as it involves high search cost2 and 
negotiation on terms of contract is also a time consuming affair (also referred as contracting 
cost), inducing a high opportunity cost. This generates the need for involving into a long term 
relation between the employer and employee. This is one of the primary reasons which marks 
the emergence of organizations. Within an organization cost of transaction is low as the 
                                                           
1
 In this context, by opportunism we mean that individuals realize that they can gain simply by being dishonest 
or from lack of candour in a transaction. 
2
  Rational individuals continue to search for a better product or service until the marginal cost of searching 
exceeds the marginal benefit.  
parties enjoy a long term relationship. But, it brings in the problem of opportunism. As 
workers are aware that market transactions are associated with high transaction cost, they 
enjoy a minimum security from the job3  and hence are inclined towards shirking when 
unmonitored. These problems associated with asymmetry of information and its economic 
significance has gained importance in organizational theory for quite some time. 
Existence of asymmetric information in the labour market invites problems related to 
labour management issues, which has a wide variety of implications for both firms and 
workers. The informational asymmetry between the employer (principal) and employee 
(agent) creates difficulties in motivating one party (agent) to act in the best interest of another 
(principal) rather than her own interest and this creates agency problem. For example, 
consider a patient (the principal) wondering whether her doctor (the agent) is recommending 
expensive diagnostic test because it is truly necessary for her treatment, or because it will 
generate an additional commission from the diagnostic centre for the doctor. In fact this 
problem of opportunism potentially arises in almost any context where one party is being 
paid by another to do something, whether in formal employment setup or in any informal 
negotiated deal. Thus, it is often observed that the interest of the agent and the principal are 
not aligned. Indeed, when the deal is such that it is in the best interest of both the parties then 
also a suboptimal outcome is reached. This deviation from the principal's interest by the agent 
is called principal-agent problem (this problem is also referred as agency cost.) Moral hazard, 
which is a special case of asymmetric information, arises in a principal-agent problem 
because agent usually has more information about her actions or intentions than the principal 
does and it is impossible for the principal to perfectly monitor the agent. According 
to contract theorists, since perfect monitoring is almost impossible, therefore to address the 
problem on moral hazard, the principal needs to structure and offer the agent with such an 
incentive that motivates the agents to work appropriately and outweighs the incentive of the 
agent to shirk. Thus, proper utilization of human capital requires an efficient structure of 
managerial strategies within an organization. The necessity to have a right organizational 
design and incentive structure has been discussed by Athey and Robert (2001). In recent 
decades, there have been advances in the study of information asymmetries4 to understand the 
                                                           
3
 As they realize that, given their level of skill, finding a new replacement for the employer is costly. This 
feeling partially reduces the probability of losing job.  
4
 The development in information economics, which is a branch of microeconomic theory, studies how 
information influences many decisions and complicates many standard economic theories.  
 
role of incentives in moral hazard problem and their implications in theory of contracts. In 
this context, worth mentioning is the seminal work of Holmstorm (1979) where how 
imperfect information can be utilized to improve the incentive structure in a principal-agent 
relationship subject to moral hazard has been analyzed. 
The study of incentive structures is central to the analysis of all economic activities. 
Specially, in contract theory, the optimal structure of incentives under different circumstance 
has been analyzed widely. Together with financial incentives, role of non-financial incentives 
in evoking correct level of effort has also gained importance in recent studies in economics. It 
is well established by social psychologist Leon Festinger (1954) that relative position in the 
wage ladder does matter to human beings as they make social comparison. Exploiting this 
fact, organizations also uses a range of non- pecuniary incentives, one of which is status 
incentives. For instance, it is a common practice to award top sales people with medals, rings, 
sculptures, and so on, at grand ceremonies organized by firms (see Nelson, 2012).  Instead of 
offering pecuniary payments, organizations like military, make extensive use of medals 
which conveys status to the recipients. When organizations use monetary incentive to 
generate extrinsic motivation5 among the agents, then the firm has to bear with the financial 
cost associated with it. But creating status is almost costless and yet it influences agents to 
take correct effort. Thus, the benefit from the use of status is more compared to its costs. 
Hence, for the principal, creating motivation through status incentive is economically more 
meaningful than use of monetary incentive. Yet again, status incentive is not as powerful 
instrument as monetary payoffs. Sole use of status does not work as a proper incentive in 
eliciting desirable effort. The emergence of an influential literature captures the different 
aspects of status as a non- monetary incentive and its significance in human resource 
management. Our paper intends to summarize these different studies in a concise manner and 
comment on the divergent views on valuation of status, relation between monetary and status 
incentives, the technique of modeling status and on the cost of introducing status.  We also 
underline the some probable adverse consequences associated with the use of status 
incentive. 
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following manner: Section 2 discusses how 
incentive works in generating motivation among the employees and eliminating the problem 
of moral hazard. In section 3 the detailed survey of literature on status incentive explaining 
                                                           
5
 See Bénabou and  Tirole (2003) for an elaborated description of difference between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. 
the different aspects associated with the use of status as an incentive has been discussed. 
Finally, in Section 4 concluding remarks are made and some light is thrown on possible 
future research works.  
 
2. Incentives: Driver of motivation:  
“The contributions of personal efforts which constitute the energies of organizations are 
yielded by individuals because of incentives.” 
Chester Barnard (1938, p. 139). 
Conventionally, a contract is offered to the agents, which constitute of incentive 
measures, such as salaries, secondary benefits, bonus and sanctions, to motivate agents to 
increase their performance. In traditional agency theory a contract is defined to be efficient 
only when it maximizes the net expected economic value of the principal after transaction 
costs (such as contracting costs) and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying 
this is an efficient contract minimizes agency costs. Standard economic models consider that 
an individual’s preference depends only on pecuniary variables. There exists an evoking 
literature studying the role of monetary incentive. Though research in this area has been 
highly interdisciplinary, yet most of the studies are applications of agency theory. In 
accountancy, for example, how accounting-based bonuses indulge managers to manipulate 
earnings has been studied. The relative capacities of accounting-based and stock-based 
performance measures have also been analyzed. 6   The association between executive 
compensation and corporate performance, investment decisions, capital structure, dividend 
policies, mergers, and diversification has gained importance in financial economics. 7 
Industrial organization economists have examined the game-theoretic effects of strategic 
interactions on compensation policy and have documented the effects of regulation and 
deregulation on executive compensation.8Sociologists and organizational behaviorists have 
examined issues such as social comparisons and the behavioral effects of wage dispersion. 9 
                                                           
6
 The seminal article on earnings manipulation is Healy (1985); see also Pourciau (1993) and Holthausen, 
Larcker, and Sloan (1995). Lambert and Larcker (1988), Sloan (1993), Bushman and Indjejikian (1993), and 
Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) analyze accounting-based vs. stock-based performance measures. 
7
 See, for example, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) on financing decisions, John and John (1993) on capital 
structure, Agrawal and Walkling (1994) on takeovers, Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz (1998) on liquidation 
policy, and Lambert (1986), Campbell, Chan, and Marino (1989), Smith and Watts (1992), Hirshleifer and 
Suh (1992), and Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) on investment behavior. 
8
 See, for example, Carroll and Ciscel (1982), Hubbard and Palia (1995), Joskow, Rose and Wolfram (1996) 
Contributing to wealth of literature studying the role of monetary incentives in 
accentuating motivation of the agents, Winter (2004) has derived an optimal allocation of 
incentives in the presence of asymmetric information among agent and show that when the 
mechanism aims at inducing all agents to exert effort under such situations differential 
rewards may be unavoidable even when all the agents possess ex-ante identical attributes. 
Offering discriminatory contracts to identical agents has also been asserted as a meaningful 
economic activity by Dhillon and Herzog-Stein (2009) when agents are conscious about their 
rank in the wage ladder. But to construct an optimal contract the best way to measure 
performance of an agent is relative performance measure. Grossman and Hart (1983) have 
explored the use of relative performance in construction of optimal incentive contract in 
single agent framework and Mookherjee (1984) has extended that in multiple agent 
framework.  
 
2.1: Classification of incentives: 
Though, a common taxonomy divides incentives into three broad classes: remunerative 
incentives or financial incentives, moral incentives, coercive incentives, however, in 
economics the prime attention is given to remunerative incentives rather 
than moral or coercive incentives. The reason being – remunerative incentives are the main 
form of incentives used in organizations, whereas moral and coercive incentives are more 
characteristic of the sorts of decisions studied by political science and sociology. The 
organizational theory has emphasized typically on two types of incentives, monetary 
(pecuniary) and non-monetary (non-pecuniary), for generating motivation among the agents. 
Clark and Wilson (1961), however, have identified three varieties of incentives and have 
discussed how the composition of incentive structure changes with the change in 
organizational character and purpose. They have classified the firms according to the types of 
incentive offered by them, viz. material, solidary and purposive incentives. But, these 
incentives can also be broadly brought under the main to categories of incentive, i.e., 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary.  Though non-pecuniary incentives are not perfect substitutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on regulation and compensation, and Aggrawal and Samwick (1997) and Kedia (1997) on strategic 
interactions. 
9
 See, for example, O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988), Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989, 1994), Virany, Tushman, 
and Romanelli (1992), Boeker (1992), Cowherd and Levine (1992), Hambrick and Cannella (1993), 
Finkelstein (1996), O’Reilly C., Wade, and Pollock (1998), and Hambrick and Siegel (1998). 
for monetary incentives, yet it is often observed that agents' self-image as jobholders, coupled 
with their ideal about how their job should be done, can be a major source of work incentive.  
 
2.2: Importance of Non- Financial Incentives: 
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding 
incentives, contracts and organizations. But the change in human behavior captured through 
desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval has been neglected meanwhile. 
Fehr and Falk (2002) have shown that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the 
performance of agents. In addition to that they have also suggested that these human motives 
may, by themselves, be utilized as powerful incentives. Prado(2005) studies the effort put in 
by the physician in public facilities and find that some physicians who work for long hours 
for little financial rewards, whereas, there are others physicians who does not provide 
required effort and/or time in their works. This heterogeneity among the physicians accounts 
from their diverse degree of motivation. Besley and Ghatak (2005) define the workers as 
typically motivated agents when they perceive intrinsic benefits from by associating 
themselves with the job. Using a combination of basic Shapiro- Stiglitz a shirking model and 
the theory of social custom, Prado (20005) shows that punitive monitoring system may 
persuade to improve the effort of the shirking physicians but may create an adverse effect on 
the morale of the motivated physicians. But this deleterious effect can be eased off if non-
monetary rewards or recognitions are conferred to the motivated agents. Their finding 
suggests the one of the importance reasons for the use of non- pecuniary incentives.  Alcázar 
et al. (2006) through a field experiment in Peru on teachers’ attendance at public primary 
schools reveal that teachers high attendance rates in weakly related with strong financial 
incentives. This indicates that non-pecuniary incentives are the important determinants of 
teacher performance. Since public primary schools are mission-oriented sector, hence the 
teachers do not work there solely for the monetary payments. To drive their motivation 
further non- financial incentives works more efficiently. There has been quite an extensive 
research to  explore these non-pecuniary sources of worker motivation like  status10 (see, for 
instance, Frank (1984), Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss (2006), Auriol and Renault (2008) and 
Besley and Ghatak (2008)), morale (see, for instance, Bewley (1999)), team spirit( see, for 
instance, Kandel and Lazear (1992)), preferences for cooperation (see, Rob and Zemsky, 
2002) or fairness (see, for instance, Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Fehr and Schmidt (2003)). 
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 A detailed literature review on status is given in later section. 
 There also exists a strand of literature in behavioural economics studying how incentives 
work as a motivating factor to an agent under different circumstances. For instance, Al-
Ubaydli et al. (2008) with the help of a natural field experiment show that in response to 
positive non-pecuniary gifts workers increase their observable effort at the expense of 
decreased unobservable effort, yet they reduce both dimensions of effort in response to 
negative non-pecuniary rewards. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) through experiments have 
demonstrated how pecuniary incentives and their relative pecuniary payoff standing motivate 
an agent to take up the desirable effort. 
  
3. Status Incentive:  A critical review: 
Economists have generated a substantial amount of research in organization theory which 
have identified and studied the role of monetary incentives in eliciting desirable effort by 
economic agents. Though monetary payment is considered to be the key component of the 
actual incentive package often organizations use a range of non- pecuniary incentives, like 
status incentives. The significant role of status as a non-pecuniary incentive to elicit the 
desired outcome has gained importance in recent studies. It can be traced back in Frank 
(1984) that individuals value status and an implicit market for within-firm status is shown to 
produce welfare gains. It was primarily been brought forth by Frank (1985) that individual’s 
concern about status permeates and largely affects a broad range of human behaviour.  He 
also points out the flaws associated with economic analysis when these fundamental elements 
of human nature affecting their economic choices are neglected. Incorporating the fact that 
humans care for status Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004) has derived that students perform 
better in presence of optimal grading system as compared to exact numerical scoring system. 
The grading system works by creating small elite class (the students achieving grade ‘A’) 
among the students.   Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss (2006) identifies that the degree of status 
consciousness varies across cultures and different individuals’ perception. In their study they 
conclude that a diverse (in respect of their perception about status) workforce helps in 
increasing the output of the economy. Assuming that agents in a contest care about their 
relative position Moldovanu et al. (2007) studies the optimal design of organizations. Brown 
et al. (2007) is one recent exemplary work which has shown that importance of rank within 
organizations with empirical as well as experimental support. Also, there is some 
experimental evidence, both in psychology (Jemmott and Gonzalez (1989)) and economics 
demonstrating the importance given by individuals to status and how it affects behaviour in 
negotiations (Ball and Eckel (1996)), markets (Ball and Eckel (1998), Ball et al. (2001)), 
coordination games (Eckel and Wilson (2007)), and organizations either in cooperative 
settings (Kumru and Vesterlund (2008),Eckel et al. (2009)) or in competitive settings 
(Huberman et al. (2004), Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2008)).  
Hence, there are various aspects associated with the use of status incentives. Quite an 
extensive research explores these various aspects and has expressed divergent views. We 
intend to summarize these views in the next few sub-sections. 
 
3.1  Value for status: 
Incentives are, by definition, scarce11 (Clark and Wilson, 1961). Together with this 
scarcity value, status owes a trophy value, which reminds the recipient of her past glory. 
Wood (1998) quotes Will Haffer, vice president of sales with Bowne Publishing, reminiscing 
about winning a large-screen TV: “Actually the main reason I wanted it was that it was the 
top prize. I could afford to buy a big screen but it was not the same as winning it.”  According 
to sociologists, status captures individuals’ need for social recognition. There are 
neurophysiological evidences, in the area of neuroeconomics, where it has been shown with 
the help of brain activity that human beings make social comparison while assessing the 
value of their remuneration (Fleissbach et al. (2007)). In economics, social comparisons have 
been shown to influence both behavior (see for instance Glaeser et al. (1996) on criminal 
activity, Duflo and Saez (2002) on investment plans, Güth et al. (2001), Charness and Kuhn 
(2007), Gächter and Thöni (2009) and Clark et al. (2010) on effort in employer-employee 
relationships) and subjective well-being (Clark and Oswald (1996), Clark et al. (2008), 
Brown et al. (2008) Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005) Azmat and Iriberri (2010)). 
The social comparison theory state that individuals make comparison to evaluate their own 
opinions and desires with respect to others. A pioneering work by Easterlin (1974) in the 
studies of subjective happiness has shown empirically a paradoxical situation, where most 
people want more income and yet when societies become richer they do not become happier. 
Easterlin paradox has been explained by Clark and Oswald (1996), McBride (2001), Hopkins 
and Kornienko(2004), Luttmer (2005), Clark et al(2008) by incorporating relative income in 
individual’s utility function. They have provided empirical evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that relative-income does matter in individual assessments of subjective well-
being. But, one should note that status is often multi-dimensional and the value of status does 
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 Unless a commodity, a status, or an activity is relatively rare, it provides no inducement to anyone. 
not only account from the order of realized wages (see Shubik(1971)). We can explain 
another dimension of status with the help of the following example. Suppose, there is a 
society consisting of four castes: priest, warriors, traders and peasants, ranked in that order. It 
may be possible that the trader earns more than the warriors. In spite of that fact, the trader 
holds a lower position in the society. Thus, the wage rank is not the only factor which injects 
the feeling of status among the agents. Status, itself, provides an additional utility to the 
agent. Similarly, within an organization, especially in banking sector, it can be often noticed 
that sales executives (holding lower rank/status) creating more business for her organization 
earns higher income (as a commission) than their administrative head (person holding higher 
status).This is common knowledge within the firm. But, it does not de-motivate the 
administrative head, as her lower income is compensated by her utility from higher position. 
This unique feature of status motivates organizations in introducing status as an incentive.  
 
3.2 Status: ‘Costless’ or ‘Costly’: 
Often, it is observed that status conferred are created by offering a mere job title, 
(example, “performer of the week”, “senior executive”, etc.) or a paltry certificate of 
appreciation, which are costless from the part of the employer. Yet it generates value to the 
employees, as people exhibit strong concerns about their relative position within their 
reference group (Charness, Masclet, Villeval (2010)). Thus, status works as an incentive by 
stressing differences among the employees. According to Adams’s ‘equity’ theory (1965), 
people lower their effort when they realize that their return is insufficient relative to others 
around them.  It is enjoyed only by those with high status, whereas, disliked by those with the 
low status. Weber (1922) defines social status as “an effective claim to social esteem in terms 
of negative or positive privileges.” Hence, recognition (conferred through status) should not 
be viewed as a cheap substitute for money. It has a cost because it is valued in relative terms. 
This feature of status has also been highlighted, as an alternative specification, in Besley and 
Ghatak (2008), by assigning positive utility from status and disutility from not achieving it. 
The positive utility from status accrues from its trophy value and a disutility arises out of 
agent’s disgrace from her inability of achieving it. If the disutility of low status exactly 
offsets the utility of gaining status, then introducing a status reward does not help in 
increasing the motivation of agents. This cost of status differentiation basically accounts as a 
short-term result and it is one of the major issues which have been stigmatized in human 
resource management literature. In order to introduce benefits from status differentiation, 
Auriol and Renault (2008) have adopted a long-term perspective and consider an organization 
composed of overlapping generations of agents.  
 
3.3 Relation between status and monetary incentive: 
The above stated example helps us to conclude that status takes care of the lower 
money payments. Through a psychological experiment, Huberman et al. (2004) have also 
shown that individuals are willing to trade off some material gain to obtain status. Besley and 
Ghatak (2008) has asserted by providing a micro-theoretic explanation that to expend effort 
status incentive works as partial substitute of monetary incentive. Dhillon and Herzog-Stein 
(2009) also assumes a convexity in preference12 on status to show that it is optimal for the 
firm to offer ex-ante identical agents with discriminatory wage contract when agents are 
concerned about the rank of their wages. The basic intuition behind their result is that firms 
can exploit incentives from status to reduce its total wage cost. But sociologists enunciate that 
agents exhibit a taste for status congruence. It has also been empirically validated that there is 
a strong positive correlation between social status and material well-being (see Perrot (1999)). 
Belliveau, O'Reilly and Wade (1996) study how CEO compensation is affected by the CEO's 
status relative to that of the compensation committee chair. They find that high-status CEOs 
matched with low-status compensation chairs are significantly better paid than low-status 
CEOs matched with high-status compensation chairs. This complementarity between status 
and monetary incentive has been captured by Auriol and Renault (2008) indicating high-
status agents are willing to exert more effort in exchange for additional income, whereas 
better-paid agents are willing to exert more effort in exchange for improved status. 
Specifically, they find that young agents’ motivation are mainly driven by their zeal for 
building prospects for future promotion and hence it is optimal for the principal to offer the 
lowest possible status with zero monetary incentives. Promotions, which constitutes of a 
prestigious position and monetary payoff which is above their marginal productivity, are 
given out only to those agents whose past performance was good. This opportunity of 
achieving the promotion itself works as an incentive for the young workers. It is required to 
offer a combination of both status and money incentive only to the older generation. In this 
way, organization can exploits their complementarity between symbolic and material 
rewards, which is there in individuals’ preference function, to reduce the total wage bill. 
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 Convexity on preference indicates that an individual's ordering of various commodities is such that she would 
prefer choosing the averages (or combination of the commodities) rather than the extremes. In this context, it 
implies that agents’ prefer to a combination of status and monetary incentive. 
Banerjee and Dey (2011) has reconciled the two different views on the relationship between 
status and monetary incentive (discussed above) while addressing how the optimal structure 
of monetary incentives in an organization changes with varying differences in employee 
status. It is shown that there exists a substitution between status and monetary reward for 
agents with low outside option and for agents withholding very high status in the hierarchical 
(given) structure of the organization, whereas, status and incentive pay exhibits 
complementarities for agents with higher outside option.  
 
 
3.4 Status:  Ways to model: 
Though, there is not much debate over the fact that individuals care about status 
however, there exists a discussion among the economists on the proper modelling strategy 
which should be adopted to analyse the effect of status. Introducing social status into the 
utility function as an argument is defined as the ‘direct’ approach by Postlewaite (1998). The 
basis of introducing status as an independent argument in the preference function has been 
identified way back in Frank (1984). It has also found its most compelling support in the 
evolutionary argument developed by Fershtman and Weiss (1998). The proponents of an 
alternative ‘instrumental’ approach (see Cole et al.(1992)) states this approach helps in 
understanding the interaction between social concerns (like status) with the economic market. 
Specifically, individuals concern for relative standing accounts from the fact that relative 
standing is instrumental in determining the ultimate consumption level. Put differently, status 
indirectly affects an individual’s consumption level. But direct approach is not robust and the 
results predicted are sensitive to specification of preference function (see Postlewaite, 1998). 
Yet, in the most of the studies on contracts, status is modelled by incorporating it directly into 
the preference function. This is, in a way, sensible as in contract theory the basic concern is to 
understand the effect of status on the utility of the agents and, in turn, on the utility of the 
principal. In Auriol and Renault (2008) agent’s preferences depends directly on her status as 
well as on income and effort. Similarly, Dhillon and Herzog-Stein (2009) has captured the 
status consciousness of the agents in their preference function in the form of rank-dependent 
utility. Besley and Ghatak (2008) has considered that status generates an utility to the agent, 
but the utility falls with the increase number of agents achieving the status, i.e., there is a 
crowding out effect, which  drives down the value for status accruing from scarcity value. 
 
 
3.5 Status: Source of favouritism: 
A different angle of use of status incentive has been highlighted by Charness, 
Masclet, Villeval (2010).  It has been investigated with the help of an experiment that people 
invests in status seeking activities even in an environment where there is no expected 
monetary return from such activity. They care so much about their relative position/ 
recognition that they pay both to sabotage others’ output and to artificially increase their own 
relative performance. This indicates the use of status as an incentive also brings in the evil 
consequences of bias or prejudice. Though, favouritism or preferential bias persists even 
while offering materialistic rewards, yet status being costless to the principal offers a wider 
opportunity for the principal to indulge in favouritism.  With the help of a theoretical model it 
has been highlighted by Dey and Banerjee (2013) that the principal’s gain from using status 
incentive increases with the degree of favouritism. Thus, the use of status is not caveat free. 
 
4. Conclusion: 
In this paper we highlight the problem associated with asymmetric information in the 
labour market, specifically, the (post contractual) moral hazard problem. The paper aims to 
summarize the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive like status. 
Organizations often use a range of incentives to create extrinsic motivation among the agents. 
As human beings care about their relative position status emerges as a convenient and cheap 
instrument to elicit effort. Creating status by given out mere titles like “employee of the 
week” or conferring a certificate of appreciation gives the required impetus to the deserving 
agent and at the same time generates motivation among the other workers (one who failed to 
achieve the status) to put in more effort (so that they can achieve the status in future). A 
strand of literature explains that status works by creating divisions among the workers. Thus, 
the agents who fail to achieve status may feel de-motivated and status may emerge as a costly 
instrument, by large.  
To analyze the effect of status, it has been modelled differently in different studies. 
There exists a conflict on how status affects the utility of the agents and what is the ideal way 
of modelling it. The main point of debate is around the relation between the monetary and 
status incentive. Agents prefers status and monetary rewards in a combination, yet 
economists find that material and  symbolic rewards may exhibit positive or negative 
correlation. Thus, we conclude that the relation for preference of status and pecuniary payoff 
is ambiguous and situational. The paper also bring into notice that use of status as an 
incentive may bring in the evils of favouritism. Concisely, we intend to summarize and 
comment on the aspects associated with the use of status incentive. In this connection, we 
intend to throw light on possible future research on addressing how status should be used 
optimally and judiciously, given its ambiguity in labour management theory. 
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